BlackFor30
Liberation is a philosophy that must first exist in our minds before manifesting through our actions.
BlackFor30
Enduring Colonial Legacies and Political-Economic Challenges in Modern Africa w/Abel Gaiya pt. 2
Continuing from the previous episode, we discuss the persistent economic struggles of African nations and discover how the legacies of colonialism continue to shape modern economic policies. We kick off with a candid discussion on the pivotal roles the World Bank and IMF have played since the era of decolonisation, often viewed as lifesavers yet entangled in controversies of enforcing economic dependency. This episode sheds light on the structural adjustments imposed by these institutions and their long-lasting effects on African economies, fueling a discourse on economic underdevelopment.
Dive into the era of economic transformations from the 1960s to the 2000s and analyse the shift from state-led development to neoliberal policies and their mixed outcomes across the continent. We scrutinise the influence of France through mechanisms like the CFA franc, questioning whether they aid stability or perpetuate dependency. The conversation also navigates the complexities of military alliances, particularly the enduring ties with France and the U.S., and the pressing need for African nations to forge a path towards military sovereignty.
Join us, as we explore the revolutionary potential of new Pan-African ideologies to inspire unity and transformation across borders.
Host:
Fungai Mutsiwa
Guest:
Abel Gaiya
BlackFor30 is a place for exploring Pan-African theory and praxis through discourse. Send us your thoughts and questions @blackfor30 or via email at admin@blackfor30.com.
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Thank you for tuning in to another episode. I'd like to apologize for some of the audio. So during the recording we did experience a few technical issues, so there are times where the audio does drop out and in those moments I just ask that you be patient with us and I hope you really enjoy the discussion.
Speaker 2:I have a dream today. Is it too much to ask you to grant us human dignity? Who taught you to hate the texture of your hair? Who taught you to hate the color of your skin to such extent that you bleach?
Speaker 1:For so many, many years, we were told that only white people were beautiful. You're afraid that if you give us equal ground, that we will match you and we will override you. Black is beautiful.
Speaker 2:Greenhood, Say it out loud we're free.
Speaker 1:Greenhood, usa, kango. Ni dumbo powa kachero, which means don't forget who you are or where you came from. Welcome to Black for 30. Thank you for coming through and joining us in another discussion on Black for 30. Another discussion on Black for 30. And, of course, before the episode begins, we just need to observe 15 seconds as just being quiet, just so you can wrap up whatever it is you're doing and then we can fully engross ourselves in this discussion to come. So the 15 seconds start now.
Speaker 1:I want us to explore, or at least touch on, the period of decolonization, because I also think there are some interesting insights in as far as that goes, in terms of getting an understanding of why we are where we are as well. Because when you look at how the result of decolonization was obviously shrinking the economies of these big countries, a huge part of it due to loss of cheap labor and access to the resources, right. So in helping sort of sustain some of that resource drain, I think these countries have leaned heavily on two institutions, which is the World Bank and IMF, and again for context for people who are unfamiliar with these organizations, so like the World Bank assists with development programs, whereas you've got the IMF, which steps in to promote international trade, and a big vehicle it uses to do that is through loans, which come with imposed structural adjustments is what they call them and these adjustments are essentially conditions which prioritize exports over local consumption, forcing African governments to export raw goods, you know, through international markets, and then having to then import from the West, you know, the essential products that we need, you know, for just bearable living conditions, right, and just to highlight the predatory nature of these organizations, you know. I'd like to share some of the conditions that they do impose on on, you know, on some of these governments, or they have imposed on some of these governments, african governments, right, um, you know, from currency devaluation to, you know, reducing bank credit to raising interest rates, uh, you know capping wages, offering incentives to, you know, multinational companies, and you know the list does go on.
Speaker 1:But the system, in a way, also results in a lot of capital outflow from, you know, from the continent, you know, where I think there's a stat I remember reading of how, for every dollar of aid, borrowing countries lose approximately $24 as outflow, which then kind of highlights how the term foreign aid is very misleading. It creates this narrative that distorts what's actually happening by portraying some of these institutions or countries as saviors and we say institutions when we're talking about World Bank and IMF. But it's also important to note that the US has veto rights and reaps financial benefits from those organizations, and, of course, another usual suspect in that is the UK. So it's clearly not in their interest to minimize our debt, their interest to minimize our debt. So what are your thoughts on how these mechanisms perpetuate economic dependency and our underdevelopment?
Speaker 2:Yeah, so first, historically, finance. Okay, I was about to go too far back in time, but let me just start from the 1940s. So many of these organizations, institutions, the global financial architecture after the Second World War. So the Bretton Woods institutions were created before African countries had any say so they were still part of empires at the time. So when the Bretton Woods institutions were being negotiated in the 1940s and the World Bank was created, the IMF was, Keynes was a key actor in those negotiations and Britain was still an empire at the time.
Speaker 1:So the needs and and it's interesting just a side point on that it's quite interesting how some of these key figures who are pushing these philosophies, how some of them would also be funded by those very governments. Oh, yeah, yeah, but yeah, sorry to cut you off though. Yeah, keep going.
Speaker 2:It's interesting. Okay, so the needs of African countries, developing countries in general, were not fully factored into that. So even when you talk of the Marshall Plan, which introduced the modern concept of foreign aid as we know it now by President Truman in 1944, I think 1945. This was directed towards mostly towards Western Europe, directed towards mostly towards Western Europe and when, after colonial at the time, that was the beginning of the colonization as well. So you had 1945 when, for example, nnamdi Azikwe was part of a delegation that signed a petition asking for independence for African colonies as well. But it was also the time when the British were also starting to create colonial development projects, so the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, for example. And in France you have the creation of feeds, funds for investments and I forget, but the equivalent of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in Britain. And these programs significantly expanded financing for colonies, expanded financing for colonies, for colonial developments.
Speaker 2:And from the start they were also very tilted in how they were applied. First they were always insufficient, but how they were applied to much of it. For example, in French Ossafia I went to Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire and a lot of the rest, the continental territories in Mali and Niger got very little. But aside from that, these mechanisms were then by the 1960s, when independence then began, these structures were then transitioned into they were just given new names. So you still had, say, the French financial architecture of the, the Sefer, still persisting, but the meaning of Sefer changed, so the Franczone continued. Aid, the meaning of Sefa changed, so the Franc Zone continued. Aid was passed from the colonial ministries into the foreign ministries, and then the World Bank IMF was repurposed not just to give aid to Eastern European countries and maybe some Latin American countries, but also now African countries.
Speaker 2:And at the time many African countries did not see these arrangements as problematic. They saw their countries as needing modernization, and so they had all these national development projects where they estimate that they have internal resources, public resources of about, say, 40% or 50% to fund these development projects, and then the rest come from external sources. So world bank, the world bank was a major donor for large infrastructure projects. But also you had private capital also coming in, especially in the 1970s. Capital also coming in, especially in the 1970s when the first oil shock happened, and many of these oil for African countries that were pursuing industrialization, development and all that and it all ended with. So there were multiple problems with this architecture. The in the Frank zone for French West Africa, you had reserves of the African countries being kept in France, and that's a dead France's balance of payments Economy an economy. But because a country could not lend, the cap for a country's lending or credits that could be given was dependent on its reserves. It also meant that the wealthier countries in Francophone West Africa were the ones that were able to take on more loans as well. But at the same time you did not have as much foreign aid coming to Africa as was seen in East Asia. So in East Asia you saw the United States providing a lot of aid to South Korea and Japan, japan was reconstructing after the war, vietnam during the Vietnam War and a few other East Asian countries. So on a per capita basis, the amount of dollars coming in per head, per person in these countries was substantially higher than Africa. But Africa was coming in at a very low point.
Speaker 2:So much of the debt crisis of 1980s. So all that came crashing in the 1980s when you had the recession in the United States and the Volcker shock. So Paul Volcker, who headed the Federal Reserve Bank, volcker, who headed the Federal Reserve Bank, the decision was made to increase interest rates, and so, by sharply increasing interest rates, you had all these dollar-dominated loans that African countries had taken multiplying, so they now had to pay more in terms of the loans that they had already taken, and this led to a series of debt defaults. So once the IMF came, imf specializes more in stabilization loans, so, as you say, structural adjustment loans. This was an ideological decision. It was not. It was. So.
Speaker 2:The Baker plan was that we lend these loans but require them to make changes in their economic policies and in economic structures, and so you had all those things that you mentioned, and many African countries took those loans.
Speaker 2:So you had the Lagos Plan of Action first I think that was 1980, which was stating that the reason for the crisis at the time the generalized crisis across the developing world, but Africa in particular, was external. So a lot of external economic influence and inadequate support in terms of consensual loans or grants, so foreign aid rather than debts, debts lending Whereas you had the BEG reports published by the World Bank, which are saying, no, the fault was African states, african governments and African elites who were making all these problematic economic policies that were not creating economic growth, were blocking entrepreneurship and blocking investments, and all that, and so you had the BEG report. We now have the ministers of finance asking for coming to the IMF for these loans, coming to the World Bank for debt forgiveness, and so they were then asked to to take these loans and then implement these changes and these changes it's so funny, like it's like how they're literally so it's convoluted, but like when you then look at it, it's like how much effort do they have to go through just to get what they want?
Speaker 1:like they're literally, you know, pulling strings on both ends. Yeah, exactly so bizarre, sorry, but yeah, keep going predictably, all that led to the last decades.
Speaker 2:So initial predictions of orthodox economists. Remember that economics itself was undergoing a revolution, a counter-revolution at the time. So the previous decades, from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s, was largely amenable to state-led development theories bringing in foreign aid to fund large infrastructure projects to advance the states, putting in tariffs and barriers to shield your national, your domestic economy from foreign competition in order to build your domestic industries in order to grow. But then you had the 1980s coming in with the neoclassical counter-revolution, so that's when you had the neoliberal revolution as well Exactly Milton Friedman and such, and so you had lost decades of growth where growth in Africa in general overall was almost at zero percent in terms of GDP growth in 1980s and 1990s.
Speaker 2:So a lot of, and it's also precipitated several crises and conflicts in different countries. It was what created the crisis of Juventus-Bernice governments. So the absence of state revenues in order to dispense to political elites and keep the political balance. You had a lot of protests by students, student movements and workers who were seeing retrenchments in governments' work as part of austerity measures and as part of structural adjustments, requirements for you to cut back the size of your states and your governments, the size of your states and your governments. And so all these conflicts, crises, the Liberian War, the Liberian Civil War was packed off, and so on and so forth. So you then had many countries taking this since, losing decades of growth. And then you had the 2000s recovery based on China and emerging markets, growth simulating increase in demand for commodity exports from these African countries, which we are still riding to now, but it's tapering off as well. So that growth was still based on commodity exports and it is still based on commodity exports today. So we are still at a very fragile position.
Speaker 1:African countries are still, or the African region is still, the most dependent, if you are measuring based on reliance on a single commodity exports for to run your economy and dependence on foreign aid and and yeah, vulnerability to indebtedness as well in the late colonial period, right, some of these countries were aiming to retain the control that they had on their interests during that decolonization period, right, and so a lot of them were orchestrating to their advantage and they um trying or either that or trying to figure out how to sabotage the existing systems. If they were to, you know, completely leave uh africa, right. And if you then look at the, I think it's after the world war ii, right, where you had um france then establishing the CFA franc to control the vast region of the colonial empire that it had, and this obviously persisted even after colonialism ended, which was around the 1960s, right. So the CFA franc, as far as I understand, allows France to exploit African resources and secure profitable exports. France to exploit African resources and secure profitable exports. And you know, this is all within the French colonies, which were initially required to deposit, I think, about 100% of their reserves I think to what you were saying earlier, right, and I think they're in the works now of reducing that to 50, which of course still is a lot, um that will be generating revenue for france, right. So despite decolonization, france has been able to maintain um these economic and strategic control uh through, I guess I think they're called corporation agreements and the CFA currency itself, right. So this arrangement, again allowing France to extract resources from Africa at a cheap cost and sell exports at higher prices, right.
Speaker 1:So while I was, you know, when I was looking at this particular subject, I found some very interesting examples that just illustrate how far, you know, these governments are willing to go to secure their arrangements. And for France, you had, I think in 63, with the Togolese president, who was assassinated because he had planned to establish a central bank under Togolese Frank Adema. Yeah, and yeah, and he took over, you know, and after he died, you know, his dictatorship was then succeeded by his son, right, who's currently ruling. Yeah, and then you've got in Guinea. There's another example, right in the 60s, where our secretory left the CFA franc system, right, and French intelligence attempted to destabilize their economy, right, and they're flooding the economy with counterfeit banknotes, right, and that then caused their economy to collapse.
Speaker 1:And then you also look at there's another example I found interesting, which was back in 62, where Mali tried to do the same thing, you know, and their argument was how France controlled monetary policy hindered their growth, you know, since I think it was about 80% of their imports, which came from France, you know. And to fight that, the French government retaliated by making the Malian franc convertible, right? So that then forced their hand and they obviously then had to try rejoining the CFA zone. But as part of that, france then wanted Mali to devalue their dollar before re-entering the CFA zone. So, you know, we obviously can't talk about national sovereignty without economic independence, right? So this all then brings to question how closely related, you know, is Europe's rate of development with Africa's underdevelopment.
Speaker 2:It's always difficult to disentangle these things because there are also independent variables. And then examples of, I think, algeria, the CFA, franc zone in the past, and then if you look at the variation within the franc zone of countries. Okay, let me start with this. So the basic argument in favor of the Francophone African elites in the Francophone countries make is that the benefit is price stability within the countries, price stability within the countries which. So if you compare inflation in Francophone countries with inflation in Anglophone countries and other African countries in general, it's lower in Francophone countries, but that comes. It's lower in Francine countries, but that comes at the cost. The arguments that they make is that that comes at the cost of not having enough resources domestically to spend on your development needs. So it constrains your access to financing, access to credits, your ability to use development banking. So central banking as development banking, just like Nigeria can. Nigeria Central bank can create a facility, a ANCO borrowers program, for example, funded with billions of naira, to fund agricultural production, smallholder farmers in Nigeria. So these other countries in the Frank zone don't have central banks that can do that, for example. So it seems like, yeah, the franc zone is not needed, but the expectation of the results of abolishing the franc zone should not be too overestimated. It should be destroyed, but it should not be overestimated. It just means that the countries would be monetarily sovereign, independent and can make decisions in terms of their banking systems and their monetary systems that contribute to their national development efforts. But those national development efforts face substantial barriers that are not related to monetary dynamics. So that is the basic gist of it. So that is the basic gist of it.
Speaker 2:The main problem is abolishing the francophone, which is a very Since French elites and pro-French elites in African countries are a very substantial block.
Speaker 2:Within these francophone countries there is a whole ideological cultural system, francophonie. French elites go to France, they have traditional homes, they speak French and are part of the French intellectual what do you call it? Culture, arts, and so they perceive that cultural affinity that the bourgeois African Francophone elite has is also tied to economic interests as well, that is freely convertible and that is not vulnerable to inflation. So it's the difficulty of getting that outside of a revolution like the type that a military revolution in this age of winning French, in this age of winning French or winning you understand what I'm saying in terms of like the Niger, mali, burkina Faso coups and the anti-French, anti-french perceptions and anti-French sentiments. Exactly so it is more viable in those contexts than in contexts of the conventional democratic systems, where rulers see political stability and they just need to have a states that can employ a large number of people and keep the peace and not drop the boots and still maintain everything, the frank zone, and so you need some level of turbulence for for things of change.
Speaker 1:I mean, my opinion really is fuck the elite, right, especially the African elite, because they are unpatriotic as far as I see it, you know and I just hope that I guess, we get to a point where because I'm I'm obviously not the only person that feels that way and, um, I think the more interesting phase of where we're at is what catalyst going back to what we were saying before what catalyst is it going to take to then get us from a point of dissatisfaction and complaining about these unpatriotic leaders and elites to then revolting against their actions? You know, like it's common even in in european history, right where that happens. And you know, like it's common even in in European history, right when that happens, and you know, there's the fight between the proletariat and the and the bourgeoisie, right. So I want to switch a little bit here and I'm curious to talk about the, I guess, the the military side of things a little bit.
Speaker 1:When you look at how some former imperial powers have maintained a military presence in Africa under the guise of doing collaborative projects or counterterrorism efforts. For example, you've got the US that currently built a drone base in Niger, which was, I think, about a billion dollars, which is ridiculous. Yet African nations lack the protocols or the technical capabilities to oversee any of the activities that they're doing on our soil, activities, you know, um that they're doing on our soil and their reports, which also indicate how, you know the presence of, you know, french or american military forces, has failed to actually mitigate um any of the conflicts, um, or terrorism or transnational crime which you, which they claim to be there to achieve. So how have we arrived at a point where countries like France and the United States, considering the historical ties that we have with them, in establishing military bases on ISIL, because the reverse situation would be unthinkable?
Speaker 2:Let's say after colonialism. So as part of the cooperation agreements, the economic dimension was the dimension you mentioned of currency, franc zone, but also like allowance of open-door policy for investments from that country. But the military dimension was also, especially in countries that had no, both in context of countries that did not have a strong military, colonial military infrastructure, you had agreements for France to be a guard of military security and political survival for the elites. So countries like, I think, togo had a very small military itself and Silvanus Olympio was famously opposed to having a military but maintained good relations with France, and the arrangement was that France would also provide military assistance in the event of any threats, any threats, and Cote d'Ivoire as well had that arrangement. Senegal had French military personnel as well. So over time this reduced.
Speaker 2:But as the war on terror spread from the Middle East to Africa in the early 2000s and also the United States increasing military bases, africom and other initiatives in the Sahara, in the Sahel countries and the French as well, when the Tuareg Rebellion started and then morphed into the terrorism, with al-Qaeda in the middle, al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, jainism and others coming in, we now saw demands by African leaders for military assistance from these countries as well. Also for greater bilateral military assistance, sometimes in the form of technical aid, technical assistance, sending military personnel to be trained by military academies of Britain or France and the United States, or joint operations. And all that and yes, it largely comes in the form of or comes from a place of perception of military inadequacy for these African rulers. Initially, originally, it came from a perception of okay, they don't want to spend on their militaries. But as military coups also increased over time, from the first military coup in 1963 to the last few in the 1990s, you saw military, african military spending increasing and building their own national armies, increasing military personnel in their armies, so you had a strengthening of militaries.
Speaker 2:But it seems that with the war on terror and the expansion of the zone of American influence in that war of terror during the Bush era and till now in East Africa, with the Horn of Africa crisis, in Somalia, sudan, almost everywhere, now even the DRC, you have these demands for more sophisticated military installations and military assistance which could have been ameliorated if African militaries, african governments, had a formal military pact, so if they had jointly negotiated a standard military assistance program, jointly and stated and enabled. So at the moment, right now, a country that is overrun with terrorism, say Mali, and has troops that cannot cover the entirety of northern Mali, northern Mali has to is forced to request for external assistance, and it's often France, the United States, whereas there are surplus troops in another country, another African country that is not facing a security crisis and this has been observed especially in West Africa, where Mali is facing these things but, say, Cote d'Ivoire, for example, or Senegal is not, and so there is no mechanism for. For what do you call it?
Speaker 2:An alliance so that you can easily and promptly redistribute troops across the continent, just as within a country, you would redistribute troops from a southern command into or repatriate a base from, as Nigeria did repatriating the base to the northeast from Kaduna when the Boko Haram crisis was happening.
Speaker 2:So that is one in a Pan-African sense.
Speaker 2:That is one important driver the absence of that Pan-African option.
Speaker 2:And you've had attempts to form multinational joint task forces, say in the Lake Chad Basin area, where Nigeria, cameroon, chad and Niger formed the multinational joint tax force to have joint operations against Boko Haram. But that does not involve and part of it was also in Nigeria's case, and part of it was also in Nigeria's case as a means of rebuffing the need for American troops, which the US was proposing as an aid to the Boko Haram crisis. But there are various limitations to that approach, limitations to to that approach, rather than having a, a solid military alliance that is more widespread, because still in these countries their troops are also and still are inadequate. And even the g5 sahel you find several problems, similar problems, uh, g5 sahel with Mali, I think, mauritania, niger and some others sort of alliance and then a strategic program to revamp or modernize African armies, african militaries, would be the Pan-African approach to rebuffing external would be the pan-African approach to rebuffing external requirements, instead of bilaterally getting all these military installations from Europe and the United States.
Speaker 1:Yeah, just that slight change in you know how you perceive the problem. It then changes the you know the solution completely and, and I think that's a issue we face in a lot of areas across the continent. You know, I really appreciate you, um, coming through and, like you, you know, providing a fuller lens. I feel like you know, I've gotten to take more. I guess I'd say you've shared a bit more light on some of the issues that you know I was familiar with. But it's just, you know, interesting when you then get that historical perspective to like you know where you then get that historical perspective to like. You know where a lot of this stuff started.
Speaker 1:To end our discussion, I want to quote something, um on lenin, who, um, like I mentioned before, you know one of those people who were funded by governments but uh, nonetheless, you know he was uh wise in his own rights. There's a quote where he says imperialism is the eve of the social revolution, of the proletariat. You know the working class. Do you think or do you feel like? Do you think or do you feel like we're ready as a people? Right, because I think we can talk about the systems as much as we want, but the people have a lot more power than they realize and I think you know there's a lack of courage to act on our citizenry.
Speaker 2:Yeah, this is always a bad question to ask me, because I mean because I'm traditionally a pessimist when it comes to these things I think for some countries things may be ripe, for some others, for most others, actually, it may not be, and it's always difficult with the balance of power and the history of revolutions as well. So, for example, things that are happening in Nigeria, for instance, where you have a lot of foregone potential the most populous black country in the world. It had the oil resources that Saudi Arabia used, or Qatar used, or UAE used for its, or Libya under Gaddafi, used for progressive purposes but did not actually use in the case of Nigeria. But you have various crises hitting the populace back to back and at some point in 2011, john Campbell, the political scientist, was predicting that Nigeria could produce I'm trying to remember the evolutionary he was using, but let's say, nigeria could produce a Lenin innocence. So in Nigeria's case, I think things are at a level where it is possible, for if a movement emerges that is not focused on electoral competition alone as such. So the most progressive movement that emerged, with all these problems, with the NSAS movement and all that, was the Labour Party, particularly Peter Obi, who was the presidential candidate during the last sections for that, but his rhetoric was typically very, was entirely very business-oriented, just the normal. We need to fix the economy, corrupt politicians, but good governance, the typical good governance rhetoric. So there was no revolutionary or radical rhetoric that emerged during the last election and the election was a major talking point was the suffering that Nigerians had experienced, the levels of insecurity that are currently growing across the country, banditry, kidnapping, father-header crisis and Boko Haram and all that so many areas of crisis, but not a transformative or radical movement emerging. So if one could emerge, I think it could better steer the general populace into action than what we saw with the Labour Party movement movement and the same in other countries.
Speaker 2:Most of the protests or movements tend to be very narrow in scope and I think there has to be an ideology that emerges that has strong Pan-African contents that can spill over to other countries as well, just as how anti-colonialism as a sentiment was able to spill from country to country Ghana gaining independence first, 1953, and then other countries aspiring to gain independence, and you had the first African interterritorial party, the RASA, the Rasa Temblimo Democratic African.
Speaker 2:Imagined that a single political party but had was present in multiple, multiple countries french, sudan, guinea, senegal code de voie so, but you don't have that anymore. You don't have countries are are now insular in their politics and in even in the most progressive movements, that's that's emerging in the country. So you need to have that spark, which which was why I was trying to develop this malformation, uh arguments, and trying to do so uh, uh, within the next 10 years or so, because there's currently no ideology that requires you to know about, for example, west Africa, that requires you to know about other West African countries. So if you are studying economics, for example, in Nigeria, and you are looking at country case studies, you can as naturally go to South Africa as a system that you need to understand and know so that you understand the problems that are in West Africa and the need for regional solutions and the need for unorthodox solutions. So that level of Like the connections.
Speaker 2:Exactly that level of deep things is not there, and so you need a political movement that emerges, that is broad-based and has those connections, and because it has those connections, it can inspire movements in another West African country, for example, and the same in East Africa and the same in Southern Africa. So you need a lot of reworking of ideologies and the formation of movements and moving movements away from the tendency to just focus on electoral wins and just replacing elites with another round of elites that are focused on the traditional issues, which is very difficult to do. But yeah, we're hoping that For sure.
Speaker 1:Kwame Ture used to push right that, the difference between mobilization and organization, where you know protests, for example, right, people can be mobilized to come to a protest and people can, you know, stand against something and make themselves heard and, you know, assert themselves, but what's the bigger goal? Otherwise it's always just going to be another protest. You know another, you know another, you know whatever that other version could be, but with no you know ulterior goal in mind. So I definitely see, you know, the relevance in creating that link where, just within, even with just within the West Africanrican context, right for people to be then able to understand, and also because it's like, yes, it's, you know it could be economic or political, but it also then allows you insight into other cultures as well. So it doesn't seem so foreign or feel so foreign that, um, you know there, or there's not that much distance psychologically between myself, as you know, someone from ghana versus someone from nigeria, for example yeah, and it's, and it's very uh.
Speaker 2:It gets depressing when you think of Haiti and Liberia. Haiti got its independence in, I think 1804 or so, if I'm not mistaken so, in the early 19th century, early 1800s. So it has it's over 200 years old now and look at the states Haiti is in still after 200 years of independence. I know the 19th century was completely tough for it because it was not recognized by so many countries. It had to pay reparations to France for, for, for stopping colonialism.
Speaker 2:It's colonial. And then Laidia also got independence in 1848 and is about what now? 140-something years old and the state of Liberia still so. In the absence of these kinds of radical thinking, constant experimentation and new movements, the potential, the downside potential, is always this that, for the next, african countries got their independence in 1960, so they are most are like 60, 70 years old and, with the examples of Haiti and Liberia, the next 100 years could be more of the same thing if nothing changes.
Speaker 2:So I keep anytime people tell me, what everyone tells me, the common person tells me is always that, say Nigeria, go better, or we leave it to God, or at the most is to vote. But rethinking African history and rethinking, for example, west African history and all these interconnections means that you are able to see that the constraints to progress are so massive that you actually need more radical thinking and more radical thinking and more radical types of movements and more scale in order to overcome them. And so this type of focus on just elections and just traditional issues and focus on your country is just a means of staying the next 150 years under the same dependency and the same problem.
Speaker 1:Rasheem yeah, yeah for sure. Thanks a lot for your time. We really appreciate all the insights that you've shared. I've definitely picked up a lot, and for people listening, I hope likewise as well, and, as always, stay black.
