BlackFor30
Liberation is a philosophy that must first exist in our minds before manifesting through our actions.
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Counterterrorism, Resource Wars, and Sovereignty: The Niger Coup Explained w/Eze Olumba
Join us for an eye-opening discussion with Ezenwa Olumba, a PhD candidate at Royal Holloway University of London, as we unravel the geopolitical intricacies of post-coup Niger and the broader Sahel region. We start by dissecting the involvement of global powers like France and the United States, probing their vested interests in resource control, counterterrorism efforts, and military footprints. Our deep dive reveals the ethnic power struggles, strong anti-neocolonial sentiments, and ongoing regional insurgencies that set the stage for the coup, while challenging the applicability of Western-style democracy in Africa.
Our conversation ventures into the often exploitative dynamics between African nations and Western powers. Delving into America's military footprint, particularly through the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, we draw thought-provoking parallels with historical contexts like the Arab Spring and Afghanistan, stressing the importance of governance models that resonate with local sociocultural realities.
In exploring the colonial legacies haunting Francophone African countries, we shed light on economic dependencies and anti-French sentiments simmering in nations like Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Through compelling arguments, we juxtapose Niger's resource wealth against its poverty and draw comparisons with Rwanda's developmental strides under Paul Kagame. Our discussion culminates in a critical assessment of the ongoing struggle for genuine sovereignty in Africa, questioning whether the continent’s pressing basic needs should take precedence over democratic aspirations.
Host:
Fungai Mutsiwa
Guest:
Eze Olumba
Article: The Necropolitics of Drone Bases and Use in the African Context
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Why can't we get a parallel line between the natural resources that you have and also the GDP of your people? So why is this rich in natural resources while poor in reality? I have a dream today. Is it too much to ask you to grant us human dignity? Who taught you to hate the texture of your hair? Who taught you to hate the color of your skin to such extent that you bleach?
Speaker 2:for so many, many years, we were told that only white people were beautiful you're afraid that if you give us equal ground, that we will match you and we will override you. Black is beautiful, which means don't forget who you are or where you came from. Welcome to Black for 30. Welcome to another episode of Black for 30. And, of course, just before we get into the convo, just going to observe 15 seconds of just being quiet so you know whatever it is that you were doing, you can wrap up and then we can get into this conversation. So the 15 seconds starts now.
Speaker 2:This discussion is basically going to delve into the complex geopolitical dynamics surrounding the recent coup that happened in Niger and the broader implications for the Sahel region. So we'll explore the involvement of external powers you look at France, united States in terms of highlighting the intersecting interests in resource control, counterterrorism efforts and military presence. Resource control, counterterrorism efforts and military presence and additionally, we'll also examine the historical and ongoing legacies of colonialism and neocolonialism, so mainly raising questions about, you know, sovereignty and autonomy in african nations, and to help bring professionalism and a well-informed perspective on this matter, I'm joined by a very interesting guest, who I will let introduce himself.
Speaker 1:Hello, thank you for having me. My name is Ezeungwa Olumba. I'm a PhD candidate at Royal Holloway University of London. Thank you so much for having me once more.
Speaker 2:Sure, and thank you very much for joining me. Like this is a very, like, interesting topic and I feel you know this is almost a case study in a way, right Like, or I guess it could be used as a reference point for a lot of you know, because these issues are happening in a lot of other regions within Africa. So I feel, like you know, this applies across the continent. You know, and, to start with, what I would like to do is just provide people with that context in terms of you know what really happened right in Niger. So this would have been on july 26 last year, where you had the military junta which basically ousted uh muhammad, I think bazum um, who was the president and the crew had a significant impact on, obviously, on the peace and stability in Niger and just the entire Sahel region. Although the Kru leaders proclaimed that, you know, the mutiny was for the benefit of the people, could this possibly have been driven by other motives, like, for example, you know, power struggles between ethnic groups?
Speaker 1:power struggles between ethnic groups. Yeah, the reports we you know kind of read within that period made mention of former President Mohamed Bazoum being from an ethnic group that, within the Niger, within the you know kind of political scene of Niger, he was regarded as a foreigner. So, and I think, apart from that, a lot of other factors you know were kind of associated with it, namely, you know, the widespread anti-neocolonial sentiments within the Francophone countries that was kind of being, you know, spearheaded by the youths and you know, and also you know just some other factors economic issues within the country and this issue of the insurgency within the region which affects Chad, nigeria and the rest of them. Some of these factors kind of influenced the palace coup that happened. It was really a palace coup. No one was killed, no one was shot. General Abdurrahman Chiani kind of took over power on, you know, on the plateau code. You know, you know, in other places where you know for you to, you know successfully carry out a coup, a lot of fatalities you know will occur.
Speaker 2:Have to occur. Yeah, legitimate government and you know I don't like using that term, like you know, legitimate government because it already, you know, assumes that democracy is the only type of government that they can be. But, you know, when you consider the fact that, like it's evidently, you know, democracy is flawed for us as a continent, you know, and I think partly because you know, some of these uh systems we adopted, you know, post independence, but we're never really fully equipped to run and neither do I think that, the way you know, fully fit to serve us. So do you think that, for for Niger and a lot of the other countries sort of within that region you know, you region, You've got Burkina Faso and you've got Mali as well so do you think that we will see a transition to a democratic government?
Speaker 1:Okay, first of all, I really like this your understanding that what they claim to be democracy in Africa is not really democracy. And another factor is that whoever gave us democracy didn't really factor in the contextual realities in Africa and the implications of the Berlin conference with regards to them drawing the boundaries without considering the cultural and religious differences within differences within the communities. They all this into the framing of what democracy is. So, in the real sense, we Africans need to think and come up with what is suitable for us, what is suitable in the sense that it will be fair. The best interest of the people will be, you know, the priority of such a system. I'm a Democrat, I'm a Democrat and I support democracy. And that I support democracy doesn't mean, when I see a regime like that of Mobutu, sese, seku, then claim to be moved from dictatorship into a kind of so-called democracy, that I will support that kind of regime, so-called democracy, that I will support that kind of regime. So, before the coup in Niger, the international community, they focused on military diplomacy through aid and support Whatever France did in the past with regards to the G4 security unit, with all of the several operations they did in the Sahel, their emphasis was on security. They were happy to play along with any dictator. They were happy to play along with anybody that carried out civilian coup. It's not only the military that carried out coups. Civilians also carried out coups. Civilians also carry out career. So, for instance, if, uh, a president extends, you know goes, extends their tenure beyond the constitutional you know term, or extend their time limit, or we kind of create a, a um, a term, a limit, creates a limit beyond what the constitution says, that they should stay in power. That is a coup. So they prioritize security.
Speaker 1:Before the coup and for all these years, niger, despite having all the natural resources, they've been among the poorest countries in the world. So when this coup happened, when the coup occurred, those that came into power, general Abdurrahman and his people. Now they want to redirect the path of the nation. I'm not supporting what they did, but that was the only opportunity they saw, or that was the only way they saw as a means to bring up change, to change their leaders from being seen as puppets, to change their leaders from being seen those who receive military aid, those who seek military aid, those who sell their land for basis to receive funding. To those who are now saying I want to control the resources of my nation and I want to dictate how much I sell these resources in the international community so that it can benefit my people and also we can develop with our resources.
Speaker 1:So now, why are we not giving them this opportunity to see if this change which they are seeking will really be a true change? Because before that change, before that coup, for years prior to that coup, the democratic government, they've been there, they've been in place. They've not really you, not really helped the general ordinary people on the streets in Niger. So now the international community that focused on that prioritized security before the coup. Now they're not clamoring for strengthening political parties. Initially nobody was talking about political parties in Niger. Now they're talking about strengthening the judiciary, the media, civil society to foster democracy, which will then attract investment and development. But before the coup, did all these things attract investment and development?
Speaker 2:We're not there, I'm not aware of this.
Speaker 1:So, for instance, we should kind of make sure that these guys in Niger, we make effort to understand them, we make effort to put a tax or a lot of tax on the table for them to see that if you really need your country to develop, if you need to talk about your country in the next 50 years, this is your opportunity for the first time to see if you can change your country from being a flag independent, from having just mere flag independence, to have a real independence, having just mere flag independence to have a real independence. So yeah, so the emphasis should not be on, okay, like Paul Kagame and if you know about the case of Paul Kagame, his focus was not on democracy. Let me reiterate it I'm a democrat.
Speaker 1:Well if we use the case of Paul Kagame of Rwanda, he prioritized development. Now Rwanda is one of the fastest developing economies in the world and Rwanda is the fastest developing economy, also in Africa. If you know about Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore as well, you know about Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore as well. He did exactly that. You know about him. Lee Kuan Yew yeah, he developed Singapore. He did exactly. I think Kigami borrowed something from him. He did exactly what Paul Kigami is doing in Rwanda. His focus was on development and political stability than democracy in Singapore. So now Paul Kagame is doing exactly the same thing. Paul Kagame, his focus is on development and political stability. If you are familiar with those criticizing him, they are always saying oh, he's violating human rights, he's violating that, but Rwanda is the fastest growing economy in the world. Before the coup in Niger, didn't the political class have the opportunity to develop?
Speaker 2:Yeah, and they did nothing. Anyone stop them from developing to develop.
Speaker 1:Yeah, and they did nothing, Anyone stop them from developing. So now these guys, now General Abdelrahman and his people I'm not their advocate. They are not asking for an opportunity for them to see if they can take hold of their natural resources uranium and gold and for them to be able to chart a new path for their people.
Speaker 2:And that's a fair point, right, because for a long time, what we've been trying to do is reform existing systems which are fundamentally flawed, you know.
Speaker 2:So we should be looking at more radical approaches to resolving some of our issues, at the very least having a look at um, because I'm really keen for us to, you know, to touch on.
Speaker 2:You know how these western powers have, uh, have exactly been involved in not just Niger, but then you know, the Sahel region, but then Africa to a great extent. So when we look at, you know, the coup in Niger, right, it's obviously partly related to Franceance's involvement in the country, including, you know, the presence of its soldiers, um, and the economic and political um interests that um, that they have and had um in in asia, right, and at some point, I think, they actually warned of retaliation during the, the coup. They warned of retaliation if they felt that their interests were being threatened. And you know, you earlier mentioned France in this right, like in the sense of, you know, when I think of international law, right, and I think it's a really interesting discipline that, like, I am keen to learn more about, really interesting discipline that I am keen to learn more about Because I think how is it possible that France can feel it has more authority while it's on foreign soil and refuse to redeploy its troops from Niger, for example?
Speaker 1:That's what they call the colonial mentality, called colonial mentality. So you know, there is a school called William Ponte in Senegal. You know most of the leaders of Niger, chad, mali, burkina Faso, senegal, they were all former students of this school. So, yes, yes, you can double check that. So, essentially, this colonial school was a platform used to, you know, kind of train future leaders of Africa in the 30s and 40s and 50s.
Speaker 1:And when you are in power, when you control someone, you hand them enough tools which will help them to be free, as long as you are going to benefit from them being shackled to whatever interest or whatever kind of place you want them to be. So, all these leaders that have been heads of states or francophone nations, how on earth were they able to agree the economic policies of the CFF? Do you know the CFF, frank? How were they able to accept that? They were able to accept that because they believed in the French Afrique, they believed in this idea of France being their father. You know, relationship, yes, now, because of that, whoever is on the other side will now act as if they are in charge. So I'm just answering your question. Why would they think that? Uh, they have the, the moral justification to you know.
Speaker 2:Claim to remain in nigeria when nigeria is asking them to live and you and you'd also mentioned the resources in in in as right, and how there's such a disparity in terms of, you know, the fact that it's one of the largest uranium producers, right?
Speaker 2:Yet primarily, the mining is operated by France and they apparently have actually, you know, as part of it I don't know whether this is official or unofficial you know secured a deal where they get uranium at a discounted rate, because obviously they have a majority stake in terms of the mining of the resources, right? Which to me, is then funny when you then look at the fact that. So france then uses that uranium um to power a significant portion of um, or or to to, I guess, generate a significant portion of their electricity, right, um, whereas the contrast to that is in Niger, right, you've got, I think, one in seven who have access to electricity, you know. So, while they present themselves a lot of these Western powers France especially in this case while they present themselves as saviors, you know, clearly you can see that France has a reliance on Niger, right? Do you think they downplay, I guess, the significance of? You know how that then appears to the surface, right, because they obviously played that paternal figure.
Speaker 1:Yeah, you know, after the coup, the French authorities and most of the Western authorities. They were concerned about human rights, they were concerned about security, they were concerned about all these things, but before the coup, what we didn't, beneath these concerns, is that also of their interest. So, because whoever is coming in may now want to change partnership with, may change the partnership of who is going to, you know, extract the minerals, yeah, so now I wonder how our African leaders or do they blackmail them to, you know, cannot sign some of these agreements that they sign, or do they blackmail them, you know, to agree to some of the conditions that they offer to them? So, for instance, how, if you own uranium in your backyard, can you allow someone else to mine it and also tell you the quantity they've been able to extract daily and how much they will offer you? 5.5 kilograms, or whatever. Will you accept that? No, no way. Thank you, but that's what most of these countries are doing, not only Niger, it's also.
Speaker 1:In Nigeria, we don't have control over our natural resources, especially oil, unlike in Libya, when Gaddafi made his own racing piece. When Gaddafi was there, he nationalized all the oil, corporations, libya's oil, all the oil, you know, corporations Libya's oil. The oil belonged to them and they handled their oil. They sold their oil in the international community. They sold any amount that you know they wanted to sell their oil, and even though he was a dictator as well but he's a human being Nobody's perfect.
Speaker 1:You know One of the things he was good dictator as well but he's a human being, nobody's perfect, you know One of the things he was good at was the fact that the best interest of his people was a priority also for him. That's the kind of thing I want General Abdurrahman and the guys in Burkina Faso and Guinea to understand. One of the challenges is we need our own system of governance that will be suitable for our people, that will be suitable for our contextual realities, because you can take democratic processes that they've done forever like 100 years in the UK and bring it to an issue that got independence in 1960 and think that it will work.
Speaker 2:Kind of switching gears a little bit here and focusing on America right, when you look at the, I guess, a snapshot of America's military involvement within the region. So my understanding is so. They had the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, which was established in the early 2000s. Right, and part of what it was meant to do is aim to eliminate terrorist safe havens early 2000s. Right, and part of what it was meant to do is it was aimed to eliminate terrorist safe havens in Northwest Africa. Right and roundabout.
Speaker 2:In 2008, they ran an audit and they noted a lot of issues with the program and one of those issues was, you know, lack of clear goals, no objectives and no metrics to actually measure the outcomes of whether the program itself was successful. Right, and then, interestingly enough, you know, you hear about how the Pentagon showed how it didn't want to label the events that were happening in Asia as a coup, at least initially. Right, and part of it, from my understanding, is that they wanted to maintain the ability to be able to provide security assistance because they would classify it as a, you know, military-led government. Right, and this follows a pattern of, you know, finding loopholes to continue military aid, and you know similar situations being the Arab Spring right. So what does the US stand to benefit from maintaining military presence in Niger? Military presence in Niger.
Speaker 1:Whenever this war on terrorism is instituted, or was the beginning in a particular area, the rate of insurgency will increase, will escalate. The question of Somalia there are studies saying that around 2009, they had a number of insurgent groups in Africa and Somalia, but since the interventions of several countries like France and USA within the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel, that most of these insurgent groups they've kind of increased in number and the escalation of their activities is also being experienced everywhere. Yeah, so the answer to your question is, first of all, before I go to the question, I want you to understand that the Sahel region conducted a lot of operations G5, this one, that one, that one and even currently there are a lot of operations that are ongoing with the use of drones that most people do not even understand. So the problem is that US and France there is a failure of them prioritizing military solutions over negotiated settlements and with this kind of prioritization of security, they impose ill-suited centralized governance and security models over some of these countries. By imposing these models on these countries, it negates some of the historical and political and sociocultural you know contexts or realities in those countries. So, for instance, in Afghanistan, one of the problems that US encountered was them, you know, thinking that they will bump their way into getting whatever they wanted. So they didn't consider the religious context of Afghanistan. They didn't factor in this idea of the tenets, of their cultural realities, how they didn't factor in this idea of negotiating with these different warlords, bringing them on the table, trying to make sure everything fits in well. So they were kind of bombing using to make sure everything fits in well. So they were bombing, using airstrikes, and all that At the end of the day, after 20 years, after spending millions and a lot of thousands of people dying in Afghanistan, they left the same way.
Speaker 1:They've been in the heart of Africa. They're trying to ensure that there are no safe havens in the horn of Africa. They're trying to ensure that there are no safe havens in the horn of Africa. I mean, there's a hell of Africa, but there are safe havens in the horn of Africa. There is a place called Sambisa in Nigeria, a swamp. That's where they live and to this day they've been able to remove those elements from that particular part of Nigeria. So if there are no safe havens in Africa, we have this and all these insurgencies going up everywhere. So, yes, it is good for them to make efforts, but that effort should be, you know, in collaboration with the different states in Africa. So they use the drone-based initiative to fight for counterinsurgency in the Sahel of Africa. Yeah, but who is monitoring what they do and how have they been able to ensure that the things that how do we know that things are doing are in order?
Speaker 2:Actually what they're doing so?
Speaker 1:who is policing the police and why should there be such activities without an oversight by an external force in the Sahel? I'm not against all those activities, but what I'm saying is there should be an oversight. That's what I'm in that paper, that's what you can read from that paper. There should be an oversight and there should be an oversight and there should be a pan-African protocol of who can establish a drone base in Africa and how you can use drones in Africa. So I wasn't aware until I started the research for that paper. I wasn't aware that India has got a drone base in Africa. Do you know that?
Speaker 2:No, I didn't know that. Yeah, I saw that in your paper.
Speaker 1:yeah, yeah, but which African country has got a drone base? In India, or in China, or in US, or in France, in Italy? They've got embassies in Africa and we've got embassies in the countries. Now they have drone bases all over Africa. We should have drone bases in their countries as well. If not, if you need to create a drone base in Africa, that's the fault of AU anyway. There should be a protocol of who can create a drone base, who can establish one and how it should be used.
Speaker 1:And why there should be a protocol. That's my argument. There should be a protocol, there should be a pan-African protocol, so that you don't allow Nigeria will not allow a drone base maybe in Lagos and that drone base will be operating and, you know, kind of carrying out airstrikes in Kotonou, the neighboring country, without an oversight, without even informing the authorities in that country. So it's really bad, to be frank, with regards to there's still area colonialism in Africa, especially in the Sahel, because India will not allow any African country to establish a drone base in India or to fly a drone across cities in India to monitor people and to carry out a strike in India. No, no, India will not allow that.
Speaker 1:So you see, AU, what do you call it? United Arab Emirates they've got a drone base here. Saudi Arabia they've got a drone base in Africa. India they've got a drone base here. This country I was not even aware that they've got a drone base. That means they can carry out a strike within minutes, let's say one hour. So, for instance, if they want to carry out a strike, if India wants to carry out an airstrike with a drone in South Africa, it will take more than 30 minutes from Madagascar. They need to fly it, no pilot in it. Even if you bring it down, it will cost them only the cost of acquiring the drone.
Speaker 2:Yeah, the equipment itself, yeah, and that's to your point. Right. That's what makes it worrying, because there's zero accountability when it comes to that. I mean, the fact that there is that military presence is a question, a big question.
Speaker 1:Lack of transparency of what you're doing and how you're doing it. So that's why a protocol should come into place and there should be a pan-African effort to enforce that protocol as well. But with these kind of leaders we have in Africa that run to the Western capitals to queue up and join the bosses to go to occasions, events, will they think this way? Do you think they will accept this?
Speaker 2:No, not the current ilk of leaders that we have.
Speaker 2:There's even an added layer when you think about the whole issue with regards to the Nord Stream gas pipeline right, how, since, I think, september 2022, when the gas pipeline, you know, from Russia to Germany was damaged, right. And then when you think about how, yeah, yeah, destroyed, actually, yes, destroyed, you know, and then part of the whole story is also, you know, what's come out is how the US and the Swedish navies carried out some operations underwater right, navies carried out some operations underwater, right, so they basically built these surveillance systems underwater which can detect, uh, this, so they can detect, um, ships and, you know, submarines moving within the, the baltic region, right, so I think it's fair to assume that they probably know who did it, uh, or at least they'd have some sort of a clue, right? So when you think about, you know, the main actors, you know, in the Nord Stream pipeline explosion, right, you've got Russia and America. So do you think you know there's a connection between the destruction of that pipeline with the construction of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline?
Speaker 1:Well, as I said yesterday, they're trying to reroute that Trans-Saharan pipeline away from Niger and Algeria. Are you aware? No, yeah, it's in the news. They're trying to reroute it because of these issues they're having with Niger and also, I think, algeria. They are backing up from the the scheme.
Speaker 2:Ah, so I guess that that that gives Niger something to to to to also think about, right, because obviously, by it sort of navigating around it, that means they, they will potentially not have you know, economical benefits of of the pipeline, right?
Speaker 2:Yeah, well, that's part of the thinking, you know, one of the issues I wanted us to touch on is just, you know, looking at the colonial legacies of the West, right, and I want to challenge the narrative of how, you know, the west is continually depicted as this benevolent savior, right. Yet when we then look at some examples of, you know, imperial overreach, you know the west is influencing events and know what's supposedly independent and sovereign African countries, right, so you've got these countries having significant military presence in Africa, as we've mentioned, right. And then in your article, in one of your articles, you mentioned that, you know, the recent coup underscores this intricate web of you know, geopolitical strategies and agendas which are deeply rooted in those legacies, right, and it's been intensified by, you know, some of these western nations drive to control the resources within nigeria. Um, like, would you like to share a little bit more about you know, some of those legacies and how that interplays with the, I guess, the current context of today?
Speaker 1:You're talking about the colonial legacies of some of the Western nations within the region. Let's use Francophone, for instance. There are a lot of things that we can see today which are connected to their colonial experience. For instance, the French language is spoken in almost all the Francophone countries. The national borders that are drawn they are drawn in such a way that you see people that speak the same language For instance, some live in Togo, some live in Ghana who speak the same language. For instance, some live in Togo, some live in Ghana, some live in Chad and also this economic dependency and neocolonial ties that is ongoing, that is swelling the anti-neocolonial sentiments it's being experienced by everyday ordinary person in Francophone country. So the CFA franc let me come back to it is a currency that is used by almost all former colonies of France in West Africa and also some of them in Central Africa as well. They use it in Cameroon, central Africa Republic and Gabon and all those kind of countries. So the CFA in West Africa, for instance, is paid to the EU or to the euro, sorry and is facilitated by the French treasury. So that currency is being, let's say, printed by France and France controls the quantity they can access and also how they can access it. So in that way, whatever they do, in that way there's an economic grip on the economics by France. France controls how well the economy will grow and how far they're able to develop, essentially, so this is a very, very, very unfortunate colonial legacy which many countries in the Anglophone countries no Francophone countries are going through. That's why there are a lot of anti-French sentiments in Senegal, mali, burkina Faso, in all these West African countries that were colonized by France. So this is a very big issue as as far as this guy, these people are concerned.
Speaker 1:So you may, you made mention of uh, the, the uh stuff. Uh, we wrote in that article. So we're trying to kind of just oppose this idea of Niger being one of the richest countries in the world in terms of uranium and gold, whereas on the other side, in reality, niger is one of the poorest countries in the world. So why, what's going on? Why can't we get a parallel line between your wealth, the natural resources that you have, and also the welfare or the GDP of your people? So why is Nigeria rich in natural resources while poor in reality?
Speaker 1:So it means there's something in between between which do not allow that natural resources to reflect into the treasuries of Nishe, translate into the treasuries of Nishe. So what is that thing that is in between? It should be those that control their economies, and you know the people they are talking about, and that's why they are saying those people should go. And those people are not happy. They are refusing, although they've left. And now it is left for these guys in Niger to make sure that they don't turn into puppets for Russia. They should ensure that, whatever they're doing with Russia, that they are equal partners with Russia, that, whatever happens, the best interest of the people should be the most priority for them.
Speaker 2:Yeah, yeah, Otherwise we stand to replace one imperial power with another.
Speaker 1:The people in Nigeria would prefer to have food on their table, to have running water, to have electricity, to have good health care and care less about who is in power. Is that person a dictator or is that person a civilian? Their priority for now is having food on the table, electricity, having healthcare, having education, good roads, than if the person is wearing a uniform or not. That's exactly what Paul Kagame offered to Rwanda. I'm not supporting military coups. I'm a Democrat. But first of all, development. You need to be alive for you to enjoy democratic dividends.
Speaker 2:At a basic level. Yes, you need to be alive.
Speaker 1:If you are there, you can enjoy democratic dividends. You need to have food on your table. You need to at least have basic access to basic health care.
Speaker 2:I always think about that, are you?
Speaker 1:able to study what is going on in Rwanda? I haven't yet. It's the fastest developing country in Africa and one of the top fastest developing countries in the world. The current GDP is over $8,000, almost $9,000, unlike previously very low. If you compare that relatively with those of their neighbors I mean you know West Al-Arabian countries you see that that's a very, very high GDP, although when you compare with developed nations it's still small. But at least it's better than what it was when they experienced the genocide in Rwanda, and it shows that something's working.
Speaker 1:Yes, of course, the people that are criticizing him of not returning power to the civilian government. There are still the people saying that, oh, rwanda is one of the fastest developing countries in the world. So that was why I asked you will you want to have food on your table with electricity, basic health care, and at least have something to do? Basic healthcare, and at least have something doing, and then care less about if the person in power is a civilian or if the person is wearing military uniform? Or do you want to be to enjoy dividends of democracy when you are in the grave? Which one? Because people are dying of hunger.
Speaker 1:Now the hardship in Nigeria, in Niger, in most of these African countries, is so severe. People are dying of hunger. If you can send me your number, I will forward an unfortunate video that I watched of a young man who literally threw himself under the lorry. People are really suffering. I came back. I went to Africa. I came back recently from Africa. What I saw there? People are really, really, really, really suffering. The hardship is too much. When the poor people can't find what to eat, they will eat the rich people Very soon. The rich eat them.
Speaker 1:Yeah, in some of these African countries that claim that they have democracy mean why they don't have democracy the elections are rigged. If the elections are not rigged, they will put in power their cronies. If they don't put in power their cronies, they extend their tenure, they elongate their tenure, change the constitution to suit whatever they want, and you call that democracy. And then you sit as a member of ECOWAS and then dictate to these young guys that do not want to have puppets ruling their country. It's not as if I support them, but at least let there be a little bit of change, because change through the ballot bus in Africa does not really happen, just like in Zimbabwe. Have you really had, do you have, free change in Zimbabwe?
Speaker 2:No, yeah, yeah, I'd love to talk a bit about your research. Right, you describe drone bases and operations as manifestations of aerial colonialism, wherein one country controls the airspace of another to exert dominance. Exert dominance, um. Assuming you're speaking to someone with little understanding, how would you explain the term aerial colonialism, like in a way, I guess, like that, like in a way that can paint a picture for people to understand what that means?
Speaker 1:okay, first of all, you need to explain colonialism what it is then, before you then talk about area one. So the classic colonialism yeah, the classic colonialism was this idea of somebody jumping off a ship, running into somebody's community and telling them you, you, you, you, now you are Rhodesia and I call this place Rhodesia and now I'm going to control you. Then they will put in institutions, they'll put in processes and units that they will use to control those they call Rhodesia, and normally they will use some of the leaders in where they call Rhodesia to rule the people indirectly. Most often that was what they did. So that's classic colonialism. Then they will name you, they will change the names of your colonial education, which we are mainly to train people that will fit into the colonial administrative systems and stuff like that. At the end of the day, they created these national states all over Africa and then in the 60s mostly from 1960 or 50, 80, in Ghana, I think, 80, in Ghana, I think, yeah, our leaders, most of them that were trained by the institutions or the schools that these people that came in to, you know, rename our people as us. They started, you know, taking over power from the people and trying to say, oh, now we have independence, which Kwame Nkrumah said. No, most of what we have now is not independence, because that idea of ruling us is still there. They left, but they left some institutions and are using their own institutions also to influence what happens in our country. So he called it new colonialism. So that was President Pomegrumov.
Speaker 1:So the classic colonialism is all about some people coming in after they've shared. You know the parts. They divided Africa into different parts at the Berlin conference and then everyone. You know the parts. They divided Africa into different parts at the Berlin Conference, and then everyone. You go to the parts that you know you got and try to see if you can rule that area. That was what they did there. So in the 60s they handed over power to most of our people and then we had what we called uh independence, or some people call it flag independence. We got our own flags and some of us changed the names of our countries uh, uh good cause became ghana and rhodesia became uh zimbabwe. Yeah, so now.
Speaker 1:But when we then started, you know when our people, our leaders, then came out and said, ok, now we are in charge, you rule, nobody will control us. They discovered that they still need to adhere to some of the rules that were created, even during the colonial times. So you know, they need to then adhere to some of these protocols so you can't just start, you know, making things in the international community. So they discovered that really they are not still free. So then he called it neocolonialism.
Speaker 1:So in recent times, people, you know, some of these countries, have experienced a little bit of, you know, independence that you can control what you can do in your country, even though in the 70s and 80s, most of our, you know, if you, if they don't call, if they don't call you a rogue, like Zimbabwe, your president, he became a rogue because he didn't allow, you know, certain things to happen in Zimbabwe. I'm not saying that he was a good man, I'm not praising him, but I'm saying some circumstances. Some of the things that he, you know, he experienced, or Zimbab experienced, was a result of the sanctions that were in place because he didn't fit into the. He didn't, you know, dance to the tunes that were being played for him. Yeah, so also places like Libya, you know, you know what happened to Gaddafi because of the sort of policies he wanted to, you know, implement and the kind of policies he wanted to implement and the kind of things he wanted to put in the world economy, which would have changed a lot of things. And those things, if they change, it will not benefit everyone. So some people's interests will be jeopardized. So that was why they had to make some changes. You know about Thomas Sankara also what happened to him. He tried to transform his country and his friend was used to eliminate him.
Speaker 1:So now the question we're asking after independence, did we get, apart from getting the independence on the things on the floor, on the ground and things that we can control, what are things in this airspace? You know we have airspace and we have, there are resources that you know can be used in the airspace. So the argument in that paper is that those that colonize most of African nations are yet to relinquish power in that aspect. Because if they relinquish power in that realm you can just on your own, you naturally come in and establish something and then you start flying over everywhere within Africa by yourself. You know that's what we're calling area colonialism. So we have independence, flag independence on our natural resources, on the things on the ground, but the things in the air, which has to relate to airspace, we do not control them.
Speaker 1:So, for instance, today in Niger, even though they can control at some point, you know, their airspace for the kind of aircraft that can fly over their airspace, but some assets, which they will not have the capability to counter, can operate and nothing will happen. So, even though those assets most often those assets, are done with agreement of our leaders and the benefits of our leaders and the benefits our leaders have sold this idea that, oh, this will benefit you, oh, this will be for your own benefit, oh, this is for your own security. But why would you spend millions to come into my backyard and establish something that will still cost you millions again to maintain every year? And you tell me it's for my benefit, for my own benefit? No, I'm still thinking about it. What would I benefit?
Speaker 1:So, for instance, the drone base in Niger. They experienced an attack. Over $30,000 was stolen from the people that were supposed to deliver it for the workers in that drum base. So if, for instance, those that walk and live within the drone base are not safe, who is, who are the people those drone, those drone bases, or that drone base in particular, is safeguarded? If I cannot get security from the security company that is in my backyard. So who is that security company?
Speaker 2:Yeah, you can't even monitor someone coming into your own base, but you claim to have a handle on you know.
Speaker 1:It means whatever is happening within that area do not concern the base. Their target is to ensure that their own priority, what they prioritize, their national interest, to ensure that maybe yeah, I get it, we understand it. It's what must be eliminated, all these insurgencies. They have to be eliminated. They are not, they are ideologies and they have to be eliminated. They are ideologies. And what they want to turn the Sahel into it's not what anybody wants, but that should be transferred. The question is how?
Speaker 2:Sorry, the question is, how we do it.
Speaker 1:How you do it now is for I called for a drone conference. There should be a pan-African protocol that our leaders need to sit down together. Maybe call experts, they sit down together and create a protocol that will guide how drones are used in African airspace, how drone bases can be created. Pamukkuma said it whoever is paying you to? Whenever someone pays you to build something on your land, you are selling yourself. You've sold your sovereignty to that person. So, for instance, the drone base in Niger, it's not only in Niger, you know all over. So the drum base in Niger, it's not only in Niger, you know All over El Trombe. So the drum base in Niger, kind of, they've sold a little bit of their sovereignty to whoever owns that drum base there. You can't control everything that happens there. So it is unthinkable for UAE to allow Zimbabwe to have a drone base on their soil. Would they allow that? No way. So why should we then allow it on our soil? Why so the how is? There should be a protocol, a pan-African protocol, where our leaders need to sit down together. We harness our resources together. Where our leaders need to sit down together, we harness our resources together, we create this protocol that will guide who owns and who should run. So, for instance, there should be a protocol that, even though Zimbabwe have agreed to have a drone base owned by Nigeria in Zimbabwe, let the drones that fly off that base remain and operate within the airspace of Zimbabwe. You get the point? Yeah, you should not then tag everyone within the Southern African region, as maybe Zimbabwe. Then you start flying drones all over the place, everywhere there, because they don't have resources to counter such intuitions. So if there are kind of a pan-African protocol and if there are measures that will counter such efforts, at least people will know that the laws are there and when I go against the law, there are kind of sanctions. But if there are no laws that are not committing any crime, they're just there enjoying themselves. That's the idea. So the idea is for the creation of a law that will say you do not do this and this is how you can do this, so that when you go against the established protocol, then you'll be asked why did you do this?
Speaker 1:So have you asked the question of which drone bases were used to control or to enforce the no-fly zone in Libya? Were they flown from America? The drones? Were they flown from America? Do you know how many hours it would take you to fly and how many drones can fly? Did you get the point? Yeah, you to fly and how many drones can fly? You get the point. We have facilities, our bases, around within the areas where you have some interest. You can fly a drone under 30 minutes and then take, you know, carry out strikes as you want them to be done. So that's, this is why we need this Pan-African protocol.
Speaker 2:And one of the final things I'd love for you to explain to people, which is in your paper. Right? So we're both familiar with Achille Mbembe's work on necropolitics, right? So can you briefly explain the concept in itself and how you see it applying in the context of the Sahel?
Speaker 1:Okay, professor Mbembe, he coined this term necropolitics. It's all about this idea that people give themselves the power to dictate who lives and who dies, to dictate who lives and who dies. So in the context of that paper, I wrote that there are things I said. There is what we call an ecological technologies of domination, uh, any political technologies of domination. So it means that this idea of having drones in the air empowers whoever controls those drones the power to kill and or not to kill, and also not only that, it gives them this power of watching you while you are not watching back. You are being watched, but you are not watching who is watching you and you can't even watch who is watching you. And most often, because you know that they are watching you, even when they are not there, you still feel that you are being watched. You get the idea. So these technologies dominate you, not only when you are doing something wrong, even when you are not doing anything. That is against the rule. What you know within you that you are being watched, something might know within you that you have been watched. Something might happen to you if you step beyond certain borders.
Speaker 1:So actually, the drones are necropolitical technologies of domination. They dominate wherever they can fly. So they dominate not only the people that live within those regions, they dominate their leaders as well, because you are now a leader, knowing fully the fact that if you go against whoever is running that drone, that it can send a missile strike to your convoy, and you know what happens when that happens. Even if you have bulletproof cars, you don't know what will happen. Gaddafi had a lot of bulletproof cars, but the drones, the cars, did not protect him.
Speaker 1:You know that's what the people are saying that these technologies enact necropolitics over people. So it creates this idea of people. It creates reality, or the reality of people being under the watch of the drones and those who are under the watch of the drones. It can influence their behavior. When this, when these people's behaviors are influenced, it can make them to adapt or succumb to the ideas or whatever those who run the drones are advocating. We need to know who is doing what and how. Also, we need to have protocols of how things can be done.
Speaker 2:Yeah, definitely, ezra. I really appreciate your time and your thoughts on all these issues, and I believe people stand to benefit not only from this discussion, but then also from your paper as well. From your paper as well. Once that's up, I'll definitely share the link as well, for people to, I guess, just become more familiar with what's going on on the ground and the continent. But then also we have to be a well-informed people. As part of us trying to devise solutions that work for us, a big part of it is informing ourselves of, you know, what is the current context of what's going on on the continent. So for that I thank you, for your time and also the work that you're doing as well, which you know obviously is great and of importance. So, again, thank you for coming through, and I'd also like to thank everyone that pressed play, and I hope you each took at least one thing from from this discussion thank you so much.
Speaker 1:Thank you for having me.
Speaker 2:Thank you, um, and to the listener I remember stay black. I hope this was a learning experience to adopt and change the way you think and live. The goal is for us and that includes you to be able to see ourselves for who we are, so we can accept the person in the mirror and begin to value ourselves. Whether you agreed, opposed or were offended by some of the content, I encourage you to engage with me so we can have positive discussions in trying to understand each other. So send your comments, reviews or feedback to our Instagram, blackfor30, or an email to admin at blackfor30.com. If you believe someone would benefit from this episode, please share it. When you get to the benefit from this episode, please share it. When you get to the end of this recording, please subscribe to Black for 30 wherever you get your podcasts. Thank you for your time and I wish for you to join me again.
